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THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT  
IN THE SHADOW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION:  
ARE COPYIST’S ERRORS ALLOWED? 
 
Carmen Draghici*
 
 
Abstract: This article challenges the dichotomy often proposed by the scholarship 
and jurisprudence between the rights guaranteed in the European Convention on 
Human Rights [ECHR] and those claimants can rely on under the Human Rights 
Act 1998 [HRA]. It discusses the two contentions informing this approach, namely 
the autonomy of meaning of HRA “Convention Rights” and the authority of 
domestic courts to interpret ECHR provisions. The author relies on the effects of 
incorporation of treaty norms into municipal law, in the light of the statutory 
language, preparatory works, and the presumption of Parliament’s intent to comply 
with international obligations, as well as on treaty law principles, with particular 
regard to the interpretive competence of treaty-based monitoring organs. The 
experience of the domestic approach to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union serves as a comparator to support a reading of the HRA 
consistent with constitutional and international law. 
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The endeavour of distinguished magistrates and public lawyers to assert a 
dichotomy between the rights guaranteed in the European Convention on Human 
Rights [ECHR] and those enforceable under the Human Rights Act 1998 [HRA] 
will appear startling to international lawyers. In fact, the two contentions informing 
this approach – the autonomy of meaning of what the HRA terms “Convention 
Rights” and the authority of domestic courts to interpret the ECHR provisions 
reproduced in Schedule 1 – are difficult to reconcile with basic principles governing 
the relationship between treaty norms and municipal law. Without purporting to 
offer a definitive view on the relationship HRA/ ECHR, this article seeks to 
respond to the scepticism towards the Convention regime manifested in many UK 
circles,1
 
 and propose a view of the Act more consistent with the effects of domestic 
incorporation of international norms, the presumption of Parliament’s intent to 
comply with international obligations, and the interpretive competence of treaty-
based monitoring organs. 
‘HRA rights’ versus ‘ECHR rights’: the parallel catalogues hypothesis 
 
The contention that the catalogue of rights in Schedule 1 does not coincide 
in scope with the ECHR catalogue is phrased by Jonathan Lewis in strikingly 
radical terms: “The fact that [the two] are worded identically is happenstance, the 
                                                             
1
 The President of the ECtHR lamented “the scale and tone of the current hostility directed towards 
the Court, and the Convention system as a whole, by the press, by members of the Westminster 
Parliament and by senior members of the Government”. See N. Bratza, “The relationship between 
the UK Court and Strasbourg” (2011) European Human Rights Law Review 505, 506. 
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result of a political decision”.2 Ian Loveland more moderately suggests overlapping 
is possible, but not necessary: “a Convention Right need not have the same 
substantive meaning as a textually identical Convention article”, “[it] could afford 
more, less or the same degree of legal protection”.3 Similarly, but privileging more 
generous protection, Baroness Hale writes extra-judicially that “although the 
Human Rights Act defines the Convention rights in the language used by the 
Convention, […] it has created new rights […] and not simply given the people 
within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom the rights which Strasbourg would 
give them”.4
Is the ECHR/ HRA relationship based on a mere linguistic coincidence? 
This conjecture is rooted in a strongly dualist theory. In Re McKerr, Lord Nicholls 
emphasized the distinction between the normative source of ECHR and HRA 
rights, respectively: “These two sets of rights now exist side by side. […] The 
former existed before the enactment of the 1998 Act and they continue to exist. 
They are not as such part of this country’s law because the Convention does not 
form part of this country’s law. […] These rights […] are to be contrasted with 
  
                                                             
2
 J. Lewis, “The European ceiling on human rights” (2007) Public Law (Win) 720, 725. 
3
 I. Loveland, Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and Human Rights 6th edn (Oxford: OUP, 
2012), p. 640 (emphasis added). The author further writes: “The Act itself gives no indication of the 
degree of divergence which is permissible between the meaning of a Convention rights and that of 
the textually equivalent Convention article. Nor did the Act offer any guidance as to the 
circumstances in which such divergence would be appropriate or inappropriate”. Is this truly a 
lacuna, or is it perhaps because the Act assumed correspondence between the two to be the rule? 
4
 B. Hale, “Argentoratum Locutum: is Strasbourg or the Supreme Court Supreme?” (2012) 12 (1) 
Human Rights Law Review, 65, 69. 
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rights created by the 1998 Act. […] They are part of this country’s law”.5 Formally 
speaking, this position is uncontroversial: the ECHR is an international instrument 
with no immediate applicability domestically, while the HRA is a domestic statute; 
however, it fails to explain the alleged substantive distinction between the two sets 
of rights. The latter incorporates the former precisely – as specified in the HRA 
preamble,6 – to make ECHR rights part of domestic law, justiciable before UK 
courts. The intended equivalence is furthermore expressed in the preparatory 
documents surrounding the Act’s adoption, the government’s 1997 White Paper 
purporting, with a much celebrated expression, to “bring those rights home”.7
The dualist nature of UK’s relationship with international law also inspires 
Loveland’s argument that “there is no statutory requirement that the two art.8s bear 
the same meaning”.
 
8
 Whereas the domestic legal force of “Convention rights” is 
based on the HRA, not the ECHR,9
                                                             
5
 McKerr [2004] UKHL 12; [2004] 1 WLR 807 at [25]. 
 the suggestion that an express statutory 
requirement is needed before the internalized rights are presumed semantically 
6
 The introductory note to the HRA describes it as “An Act to give further effect to rights and 
freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights”.  
7
 White Paper Rights Brought Home: the Human Rights Bill, 1997, October, Cm 3782, para. 1.19. 
8
 I. Loveland, “The shifting sands of article 8 jurisprudence in English housing law” (2011) 2 
European Human Rights Law Review, 151, 154-155. 
9
 Section 18 of the new European Union Act 2011 (the so-called ‘sovereignty clause’) is a symbolic 
reminder of this rule of legitimacy with reference to EU norms, but does not remove the compulsory 
nature of said norms: "Directly applicable or directly effective EU law (that is, the rights, powers, 
liabilities, obligations, restrictions, remedies and procedures referred to in section 2(1) of the 
European Communities Act 1972) falls to be recognised and available in law in the United Kingdom 
only by virtue of that Act […]". 
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identical is problematic. The HRA declaredly sets out to give effect to the 
international norm, render it operative in municipal law. Section 1(1) 
unequivocally defines protected “Convention Rights” as “Articles 2 to 12 and 14 of 
the Convention” (all its substantive provisions, as opposed to procedural provisions 
concerning the enforcement machinery) and of the protocols ratified by the UK.10  
It would be surprising if, every time it incorporated a treaty, the legislator explicitly 
required that the same meaning be given to the provisions as under international 
law. The very purpose of verbatim reproduction of treaty provisions in a statute, as 
opposed to enacting a new text compliant with the treaty’s spirit and objectives,11
                                                             
10
 Some commentators seem to attach weight to the fact that not all of the ECHR has been 
incorporated (see Loveland, Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and Human Rights, p. 640 
(note 19)). In actuality, not all articles are apt to be incorporated. Thus, Art.1 contains the 
commitment towards the other parties to the treaty to secure fundamental rights; the articles 
establishing the supranational court and expressing States’ consent to be bound by its decisions do 
not have domestic, but international, projection. Art. 13 is also understandably left out, as the 
international obligation to provide a national remedy for ECHR violations is satisfied through the 
very adoption of a statute allowing individuals to enforce ECHR rights in domestic courts (s.7 HRA) 
and obtain compensation (s.8 HRA). 
 is 
11
 The distinction, in the Italian practice of implementation of international agreements, between 
procedimento ordinario (also known as ‘parallel legislation’) and procedimento speciale via ‘order 
of execution’ (restricted to self-executing treaties) may provide a useful parallel. See R. Monaco – 
C. Curti Gialdino, Manuale di diritto internazionale pubblico (Torino: UTET, 2009), pp. 351-354. 
Another example is the Swedish dualist model, where in order to become applicable to domestic 
legal disputes an international norm must be either inkorporerad (i.e. an act is passed stating that the 
treaty is part of Swedish law) or transformerad (the treaty is translated and reformulated in a 
domestic act). See I. Cameron, An Introduction to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Uppsala: Iustus Förlag, 2011), p. 32.   
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to avoid inadvertent distortions of the meaning ensuing from ‘paraphrasing’.12
More critically, Loveland’s contention that a ‘Convention right’ could be 
read to afford less protection than the ECHR counterpart defeats the purpose of 
incorporation. Malcolm Shaw observes: “There is in English law a presumption that 
legislation is to be so construed as to avoid a conflict with international law. [...] 
[W]here the provisions of a statute implementing a treaty are capable of more than 
one meaning, and one interpretation is compatible with the terms of the treaty while 
others are not, it is the former approach that will be adopted”.
 Any 
good-faith incorporation presupposes a convergence between the scope of 
international obligations and domestic implementing measures.  
13
 This presumption 
of conformity, a fortiori applicable to statutes implementing treaties, suggests that 
the adoption of HRA aimed to ensure compatibility of municipal law with ECHR 
obligations,14 not to introduce a home-grown inferior catalogue of rights.15
                                                             
12
 The preference for ‘cut and paste’ implementation of EU directives instead of by means of re-
wording them (despite the stated intention of directives to allow flexibility) obeys the same 
rationale. See the comment of Sir Robin Jacob on the point in Nova Productions v Mazooma Games 
[2007] EWCA Civ 219 at [28], discussed in L. Woods and P. Watson, Steiner & Woods’s EU Law 
11th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2012), p. 359. See further the authors’ reference to the ‘gold-plating’ 
concern expressed in the Commission Recommendation of 12 July 2004 on the transposition into 
national law of Directives affecting the internal market [OJ L 98/47], at pp. 358-359. 
 To 
13
 M. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2008), p. 153. The author relies on the consistent 
jurisprudence of the House of Lords from Salomon [1967] 2 QB116 to Garland [1983] 2 AC 751 
and Al-Skeini [2007] UKHL 26 to that effect. 
14
 The international obligation subscribed by virtue of Art. 1 ECHR is to “secure to everyone within 
[the] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in … this Convention”. 
15 The obligation in s.3(1) HRA to interpret all domestic legislation consistently with Convention 
rights lends further support to this proposition: “[s]o far as it is possible to do so, primary and 
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claim that Parliament intended HRA rights to have independent meaning rather 
than accurately reflect ECHR rights is to ignore both teleological considerations 
and the plain wording of s.1(1).16
Another justification for the autonomy of HRA rights invokes the limited 
competences of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Lord Hoffmann in 
McKerr maintains that the Court’s judgments only bind the UK externally: “the 
United Kingdom is bound to accept a judgment of the Strasbourg court […]. But a 
court adjudicating in litigation in the United Kingdom about a domestic 
“Convention right” is not bound by a decision of the Strasbourg court”.
  
17
 Lewis 
draws a further distinction under international law: “the United Kingdom is only 
bound to “abide by” rulings of the Strasbourg Court in cases in which it has been 
involved as a party”.18
                                                                                                                                                                          
subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with Convention 
rights”. 
  Loveland adds a public law perspective: “The Act does not 
grant the ECtHR any kind of appellate status within the domestic legal system. That 
court’s determinations as to the meaning of a Convention article do not have 
binding effect on domestic courts’ construction of the meaning of a textually 
16
 Affording more protection would not violate the international obligations, but less protection 
would constitute a breach of Art. 1 ECHR. 
17
 McKerr at [64]. 
18
 See Lewis, “The European ceiling on human rights”, 2007 Public Law (Win) p. 731. See also on 
p. 729: “unlike under the Convention where the United Kingdom has to accept a judgment of the 
Strasbourg Court as binding (Art.46(1)), a court adjudicating in litigation in the United Kingdom 
about a municipal right is theoretically not bound by a decision of the Strasbourg Court. This is in 
contradistinction to the position under s.3(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 whereby 
domestic courts are bound by decisions of the European Court of Justice”. 
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identical Convention Right”.19
The ECtHR is, indeed, not an appellate court capable of reversing domestic 
judgments, although it may find them in violation of the ECHR
 These statements assume that lack of contentious 
jurisdiction proves ipso facto lack of interpretive jurisdiction, conflating two 
separate issues.  
20
 and require as a 
remedy the reopening of domestic proceedings; in a 2000 Recommendation, the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe urged States to provide means of 
reopening domestic proceedings following a finding of violation based on the 
merits of a decision or serious procedural shortcomings.21 Although it does not act 
as a fourth instance, the ECtHR’s interpretation is overriding, due to the s.1(1) 
equivalence between HRA provisions and Articles 2-14 ECHR. This interpretation 
is inherent in the content of ECHR rights; the ECHR’s open-textured language 
would have little meaning in the absence of hermeneutical guidance.22
Thus, Article 2 (right to life) was found to encompass an obligation to 
protect individuals against known hazards,
 
23
 but not to protect the life of the 
foetus,24 nor to sanction assisted suicide.25
                                                             
19
 Loveland, Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and Human Rights, p. 640.  
 Article 3 (protection against torture and 
20
 In fact the acts of any branch of the State, including the judiciary, may amount to a violation. 
21
 Recommendation No. R (2000) 2 of 19 January 2000. 
22
 White and Ovey expound this principle straightforwardly: “The Convention, even with its 
Protocols, is a relatively short document. To be effective, it requires interpretation. The role of the 
Strasbourg Court is to interpret and apply the Convention”. See C. Ovey and R. White, Jacobs & 
White: The European Convention of Human Rights 5th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2010), p. 64. 
23
 Oneryildiz v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 325; Budayeva v Russia (App. No. 15339/02). 
24
 Paton v United Kingdom (1980) 3 EHRR CD 81; Vo v France (2005) 40 EHRR 259. 
25
 Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1. 
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inhuman/ degrading treatment) was interpreted to require local authorities to 
remove children from abusive situations26 and conduct effective investigations into 
credible ill-treatment allegations.27 The Court clarified that Article 6 (fair trial) 
includes a right of access to a court,28 prohibits criminal trial in absentia,29 and 
requires States to provide impecunious litigants legal aid where indispensable for 
effective access to court.30 Further, it is now well-established that the protection of 
Article 8 (respect for private/ family life and the home) extends to office premises31 
and office phone calls32 and disallows criminalizing private homosexual activity.33
These unsystematic illustrations suffice to show that most positive and 
negative ECHR obligations are the product of judicial interpretation rather than 
enshrined in the text itself. Without it Convention provisions would have little 
concrete meaning, and different meanings across the 47 parties. Consequently 
Lewis’ proposition that “it is the Convention itself, not the jurisprudence of the 
court, that is the ultimate source of the relevant law”
  
34
                                                             
26
 Z and others v United Kingdom (2002) 34 EHRR 97. 
 is unconvincing. The 
‘package deal’ of text and interpretation that ECHR States accepted upon 
ratification may occasionally entail unforeseen surprises, such as the prohibition of 
27
 Sevtap Veznedaroglu v Turkey (2001) 33 EHRR 1412. 
28
 Golder v UK (1975) 1 EHRR 524. 
29
 Kremzow v Austria (1994) 17 EHRR 322. 
30
 Airey v Ireland (1979-80) 2 EHRR 305. 
31
 Niemietz v Germany (1993) 16 EHRR 97. 
32
 Halford v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 523. 
33
 Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 149. 
34
 Lewis, “The European Ceiling on Human Rights”, (2007) Public Law (Win) p. 731. 
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a blanket ban on prisoners’ right to vote,35 or the extra-territorial effect of Art.3 
preventing terrorists’ extradition towards torture-practising countries.36 
Nevertheless, human-rights monitoring organs have been traditionally invested with 
vast interpretive powers (the UN Human Rights Committee and the American 
Court of Human Rights are other notable examples); the fact that States tend to 
observe their decisions and only exceptionally denounce the treaties indicates 
acquiescence to such powers. 37
The adjustment of the domestic legal order to EU law further demonstrates 
that the lack of appellate status is not dispositive of which court is the final arbiter 
of interpretation. The Court of Justice of the EU [CJEU] cannot reverse domestic 
decisions any more than the ECtHR; unlike the ECtHR, it does not even have the 
competence to receive claims from individual litigants against States for breaches 
of EU law (Art.263 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU]). But 
  Further confirming the Strasbourg Court’s role, in 
October 2013 Protocol 16 (not yet in force) introduced a mechanism of advisory 
opinions on the interpretation of ECHR norms, at the request of the highest 
domestic courts, during the course of proceedings pending before them – a system 
similar to the EU preliminary rulings procedure, save for the non-binding nature of 
opinions. 
                                                             
35
 Hirst v United Kingdom (2004) 38 EHRR 40; Greens and M.T. v United Kingdom (2011) 53 
EHRR 21.   
36
 Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 413; Saadi v Italy (2009) 49 EHRR 730. 
37
 Isolated examples are those of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, who denounced the Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] allowing for individual 
communications against them to be brought before the Human Rights Committee (not the Covenant 
itself though). Trinidad and Tobago also denounced the Inter-American Convention on Human 
Rights. 
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it certainly can interpret EU law provisions in the context of preliminary rulings 
and domestic courts are expected to apply that interpretation to proceedings before 
them (Art.267 TFEU). The lack of appellate status has never undermined the 
CJEU’s interpretative authority.38 As the Court of Appeal recognized in Arsenal v 
Reed, domestic judges must defer to CJEU’s interpretation (then European Court of 
Justice [ECJ]) in matters of EU law: “the ruling of the ECJ is binding in so far as it 
is a ruling upon interpretation”.39 In expounding the acte clair doctrine, Lord 
Denning in Bulmer v Bollinger implicitly accepted the primacy of ECJ’s 
interpretation when he indicated that its rulings create precedent, removing the need 
to refer under Art.267.40
Other elements in the HRA have been adduced to support the dichotomy 
HRA/ ECHR rights. Lewis argues that “Some sections of the Act implicitly 
acknowledge the distinction between municipal rights and Convention rights. 
Section 1(4) enables the Lord Chancellor…to make such amendments…to reflect 
the effect of a protocol. Section 14 enables the United Kingdom to derogate from 
 
                                                             
38
 The Court has indeed consolidated its interpretive authority by extending the State liability 
doctrine to national judicial decisions clearly inconsistent with its rulings. See C‑224/01 Köbler 
[2003] ECR I‑1023 and C-173/03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA v Repubblica italiana [2006] 3 
C.M.L.R. 19. 
39
 Arsenal Football Club v Reed [2003] EWCA Civ 696 at [30]. See also the willingness of the 
Court of Appeal in R v Secretary of State for Employment Ex Parte Equal Opportunities 
Commission [1993] I.C.R. 251, 263 to rely on the ECJ’s expansive interpretation of “pay” under Art. 
119 EC (Case C-360/90 Arbeiterwohlfahrt der Stadt Berlin e.V. v. Botel [1992] I E.C.R 3589 at 
[12]). On this point see D. Nicol, “Disapplying with relish? The Industrial Tribunals and Acts of 
Parliament” (1996) Public Law, 579, 586-587.  
40
 Bulmer v Bollinger [1974] 2 WLR 202; [1974] 2 CMLR 91. 
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an article… Section 15 enables the United Kingdom to make certain 
reservations”.41 The first observation is unpersuasive: s.1(4) merely reflects the fact 
that additional Protocols are separate treaties, only binding ratifying States; 
whenever the UK becomes a party to a new Protocol, its content needs to be 
incorporated through this fast-track amending procedure, to keep the pace with the 
extent of international obligations. The latter two examples are inaccurate: ss.14-15 
do not “enable” the UK to avail itself of derogations/ reservations (States cannot 
unilaterally grant themselves exceptions from international agreements by enacting 
domestic legislation); these sections are merely declaratory of the option open to 
States under Art.15 ECHR to suspend the exercise of a right in times of war/ public 
emergency, or to enter a reservation under Art.57, and they provide the relevant 
definitions and context (in any event, the reference to reservations can only apply to 
existent reservations to the ECHR or future reservations to protocols, as 
reservations to the ECHR can no longer be entered after ratification).42
 
 
Consequently, these provisions do not indicate any dichotomy, but quite on the 
contrary align the substance of the HRA to ECHR norms.  
Are British judges interpreters of ECHR rights? 
 
The second contention emancipating the HRA from the ECHR is that the 
scope of the rights falls to be determined by the British judiciary. The Home 
                                                             
41
 Lewis, “The European ceiling on human rights”, p. 728. 
42
 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Art. 19: “A State may, when signing, ratifying, 
accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation […]” (emphasis added). 
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Secretary proclaimed: “Through incorporation we are giving a profound margin of 
appreciation to British courts to interpret the convention...”.43  Those who believe 
the set of articles in Schedule 1 have loose inspirational connection with the ECHR 
naturally postulate that they are to be interpreted by domestic courts as this is mere 
statutory interpretation. Loveland thus proposes that “Art. 8 of Sch. 1 [HRA] has its 
own, autonomous meaning, which is to be decided by domestic courts”. 44
Any notion that national courts are competent to put a British gloss on 
ECHR rights is arguably a misconception. As any international treaty, the 
Convention can only be authoritatively interpreted by the body invested by the 
treaty itself with hermeneutic powers: according to Art.32(1) ECHR, “The 
jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation and 
application of the Convention”.
  
45
                                                             
43
 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 3 June 1998, col. 424: 
 The only legitimate interpreter of ECHR 
provisions is thus the Strasbourg Court. The British judges’ power is to interpret 
domestic law touching upon human rights in the way they deem most consistent 
with ECHR requirements. In Ullah Lord Bingham acknowledged domestic courts’ 
obligation to comply with the ECtHR’s interpretation in cases raising issues under 
the HRA, insofar as “the Convention is an international instrument, the correct 
interpretation of which can be authoritatively expounded only by the Strasbourg 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1998/jun/03/legislation [Accessed October 31, 2012] 
(emphasis added). 
44
 Loveland, “The shifting sands of article 8 jurisprudence in English housing law”, 155. The 
interpretative competence of domestic courts is the necessary corollary of the author’s thesis that the 
HRA catalogue of rights is a fully autonomous one.    
45
 The Court is also entrusted with monitoring State adherence to fundamental rights by virtue of 
Art.19, while Art.47 bestows on it the competence to give advisory opinions.  
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court”.46 He seemed to accept though the Alconbury Development qualified 
approach to compliance, allowing exceptional disobedience: “While such case law 
is not strictly binding, it has been held that courts should, in the absence of some 
special circumstances, follow any clear and constant jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg court”.47
From a constitutional perspective, the HRA itself contains a specific 
provision on interpretation: s.2 directs domestic courts seized with matters 
pertaining to Convention rights
  
48
 to “take into account” not only any “judgment, 
decision, declaration or advisory opinion” of the ECtHR, but also non-binding 
reports of the former Commission and decisions of the Committee of Ministers. 
The legislator thereby recognizes that the proper legal space for the interpretation of 
Convention rights is that governed by the ECHR machinery. The interpretative role 
of domestic courts appears residual: only where no clear indication from Strasbourg 
is available can they proceed to construe the meaning of a Convention right.49
Commentators usually over-emphasize the fact that the HRA does not 
attribute Strasbourg judgments the force of binding precedents. In Pinnock Lord 
Neuberger underlines: “section 2 of the 1998 Act requires our courts to “take into 
 
                                                             
46
 Ullah at [20]. 
47
 R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions [2003] 2 AC 295 at [26] (emphasis added). 
48
 The text establishes a clear obligation rather than a recommendation (“must” rather than “shall” or 
“should”). 
49
 See D. Harris, M. O’Boyle and C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Oxford: OUP, 2012), p. 25: “Where a point of interpretation has not been ruled upon in a 
Strasbourg case, the national courts will have no choice but to adopt their own interpretation”. 
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account” European court decisions, not necessarily to follow them”.50 Nevertheless, 
attempts to characterize the relationship between courts belonging to different 
jurisdictions (municipal/ international) by way of stare decisis would have been 
misplaced. The ECtHR itself is not bound by its previous rulings, although in 
practice it references and consolidates past pronouncements. As the Court 
explained in Cossey, “it usually follows and applies its own precedents, such a 
course being in the interest of legal certainty and the orderly development of the 
Convention case-law”.51
Moreover, the House of Lords debate on Lord Kingsland’s proposed 
amendment replacing the expression “must take into account” with “shall be bound 
by” demonstrates that the objections were hardly based on an intent to diminish the 
 The obligation for domestic courts to take into account 
Strasbourg judgments indicates the expectation of consistency with sufficient 
clarity. Significantly, the statute goes beyond judgments to include advisory 
opinions and the non-binding reports of the Commission. 
                                                             
50
 Manchester CC v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45; [2011] 2 A.C. 104 at [48]. The Pinnock re-statement 
of Lord Mance’s observation in Doherty arguably shifts the emphasis from the duty to take into 
account to the lack of obligation to follow, in fact the intention was hardly to minimize that duty. 
See Doherty v Birmingham CC [2008] UKHL 57; [2009] AC 367 at [126]: “While the House is not 
bound to give effect to McCann, under section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 it is its duty to “take 
into account” the decision in McCann”. 
51
 Cossey v United Kingdom 13 EHRR 622 at [35]. See also Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom 
35 EHHR 447 at [74]: “it is in the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the 
law that it should not depart, without good reason, from precedents laid down in previous cases”. 
The Court further explains in Cossey at [35] that departure from precedent is rather exceptional, if 
there are “cogent reasons” such as “ensur[ing] that the interpretation of the Convention reflects 
societal changes”. 
16 
 
value of Strasbourg jurisprudence.52 Lord Irvine, then Lord Chancellor and 
architect of the HRA, invoked the risk of the Bill being intrinsically inconsistent in 
case of incompatible legislation (which cannot be disapplied) and the difficulty of 
reconciling the binding nature of the case-law with the margin of appreciation. He 
found it more appropriate for courts to consider judgments against other States as 
“source of jurisprudence” rather than “binding precedents”, which international law 
did not require it to do. He further argued that “it is not considered necessary to set 
out to provide that United Kingdom courts and tribunals are bound by Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, since where it is relevant we would of course expect our courts to 
apply convention jurisprudence…”.53 He also saw the amendment as “putting the 
courts in some kind of straitjacket where flexibility is what is required”, a concern 
shared by Lord Browne-Wilkinson, who questioned the very doctrine of precedent 
on the basis that it is “undesirable when old cases are carved in stone”. The 
instances in which UK courts would be permitted to depart appear very narrowly 
construed in Lord Irvine’s speech: “[the Bill] would permit the United Kingdom 
courts to depart from Strasbourg decisions where there has been no precise ruling 
on the matter and a commission opinion which does so has not taken into account 
subsequent Strasbourg court case law”.54
                                                             
52
 Hansard, House of Lords Debates, 18 November 2007, col. 511-516: 
 The travaux préparatoires thus suggest it 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1997/nov/18/human-rights-bill-hl-1 [Accessed October 
31, 2012]. 
53
 Emphasis added. 
54
 Significantly, Lord Irvine’s example refers to disregarding a Commission opinion – which was not 
technically binding even under the Convention regime according to international law – inconsistent 
with subsequent ECtHR rulings. 
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is far-fetched to invoke the flexible language of s.2 to support a domestic ruling in 
clear contrast with an ECtHR judgment, especially if against the UK. 
Downplaying the meaning of “taking into account” in s.2 would ultimately 
deprive the statutory direction of any effet utile. Besides, this much debated 
formulation is not far from the direction in s.3(2) European Communities Act 
[ECA] 1972, which does not frame the obligation vis-à-vis the decisions of the 
(then) European Court of Justice (ECJ) in terms of precedence: “Judicial notice 
shall be taken... of any decision of, or expression of opinion by, the European Court 
on [the meaning of the Treaties]”. The supremacy of ECJ’s interpretation of EU law 
is, nonetheless, undisputed.55 Domestic courts’ obligation to follow the 
interpretation of the ECJ when applying EU law stems from the acceptance of the 
content of the EU treaties as binding on domestic authorities: “All such rights, 
powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created or arising 
by or under the Treaties, [...] shall be recognised and available in law, and be 
enforced, allowed and followed accordingly”.56 A right/ liability created by the 
ECJ’s jurisprudence is a right/ liability “arising under the Treaties”. As the ECJ 
stated in Benedetti v Munari (1977), it follows from Article 177 (now Article 267)57
                                                             
55
 It might be worth recalling that the supremacy of Parliament remains unaffected, as it is 
theoretically possible for Parliament to expressly repeal the European Communities Act 1972, as 
stated in Thoburn v Sunderland CC [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin) at [59]. The same applies to the 
HRA 1998. 
 
that “the purpose of a preliminary ruling is to decide a question of law and [...] that 
56
 s 2 (1) ECA 1972 (emphasis added). 
57
 Under Art.267 TFEU, “The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction to give 
preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of the Treaties; (b) … interpretation of acts of 
the institutions … of the Union”. 
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ruling is binding on the national court as to the interpretation of the community 
provisions and acts in question”.58
More generally, when States choose to become parties to treaties 
establishing monitoring bodies with binding interpretative powers, they sign up to 
open-ended obligations.
  
59
 The content of the treaty norms can be subsequently 
clarified in a manner that diverges from one party’s understanding, possibly 
expanding the scope of obligations.60 This is particularly true of human rights 
treaties, subject to evolving theories of morality and justice (hence the ECtHR’s 
“living instrument” doctrine).61
                                                             
58
 Benedetti v Munari Fratelli SAS (52/76) [1977] E.C.R. 163 at [26]. National courts are actually 
considered to be EU courts, i.e. EU law enforcers. See e.g. Nicol, “Disapplying with relish? The 
Industrial Tribunals and Acts of Parliament”, p. 579: “The strategy of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) has been to co-opt the national courts and tribunals onto its project of ensuring the uniformity 
of Community law”. 
 In the words of Iain Cameron, “the requirements of 
the Convention can expand as a result of the dynamic method of interpretation 
59
 The proposition stands true even where the monitoring body lacks the authority to issue binding 
judgments. The Human Rights Committee, for instance, concludes its examination of complaints 
under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR with a non binding report expressing its ‘views’ on the 
case, however the interpretation of the provisions of the Covenant as it transpires from those reports 
is the only authentic interpretation. The General Comments of ICCPR provisions also contribute to 
that interpretation even though they are not technically speaking acts binding on the contracting 
States. The binding value of the interpretation is predicated upon the role ascribed by the treaty to 
that body. 
60
 For example, the European Court bases its interpretation on the “European consensus” doctrine, 
i.e. on the practice of the great majority, not all, Member States. See e.g. Harris, O’Boyle and 
Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 8. 
61
 Tyrer v UK (1979-80) 2 EHRR 1 at [31]; Marckx v Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330 at [41]. 
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applied by the Court”.62 However, unless a State denounces the treaty, its initial 
ratification or accession implies an acceptance of the obligations spelled out by the 
monitoring body. By virtue of s.2(1) HRA, Parliament delegated to UK courts the 
responsibility for ensuring that domestic law is continuously updated to comply 
with the ECHR evolving requirements. Where this process of judicial adjustment is 
impracticable insofar as clearly contra legem, courts must alert Parliament to the 
need for legislative intervention, by means of a declaration of incompatibility under 
s.4.63
Undoubtedly, national judges ought not to revisit the meaning of a provision 
when its wording is clear or there is well-established Strasbourg jurisprudence on 
how it should be construed. Domestic courts are not expected nor entitled to 
redesign the Convention to suit their particular traditions and practices, except 
where the ECHR itself affords a margin of appreciation.
 
64
                                                             
62
 Cameron, An Introduction to the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 182 (emphasis in 
original). 
 When they do not find 
sufficient Strasbourg indication as to the precise extent of a right or scope of a 
legitimate interference, domestic judges are, pursuant to treaty law rules as codified 
63
 See s.4(2) HRA: “If the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible with a Convention 
right, it may make a declaration of that incompatibility”. 
64
 Nor can they invoke a more limited scope of a right under the ECHR to restrict the protection 
afforded under common law, as Art.53 ECHR (‘Safeguard for existing human rights’) makes it clear 
that no such construction is warranted: “Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or 
derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the 
laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a party”. For the 
same reason the interpretation of the Strasbourg Court could not compel domestic judges to restrict 
the scope of a human right guaranteed by domestic law. 
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by the 1969 Vienna Convention, called upon to interpret the ECHR in good faith, 
according to the usual meaning of the terms, examined in their context.65
Lord Bingham notes in Ullah that States can be more generous than the 
ECHR requires,
  
66
 including through their courts. They can indeed, but not as a 
matter of interpretation of the Convention. The ECHR was conceived as a 
minimum standard in safeguarding human rights within the Council of Europe, a 
starting point. Whenever a British court construes a human right to encompass 
privileges not guaranteed under the ECHR, it does not interpret the ECHR,67
The analogy with the competence of domestic courts under ECA 1972 
might prove helpful in demystifying the idea that UK judges have the authority to 
interpret the ECHR. Although the binding legal force of the provisions of the EC/ 
EU treaties depends on the ECA (even where they meet the Van Gend en Loos 
criteria for direct effect),
 but 
the corresponding common law right.  
68
                                                             
65
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Arts.31-33. 
 when they apply EU law provisions, domestic courts do 
not purport to give an indigenous interpretation, but to ascertain the ‘objective’ 
interpretation, uniform across the EU, in light of CJEU’s case law. Where no such 
guidance is available, rather than being creative domestic courts have the option (or 
obligation, for final courts) pursuant to Article 267 TFEU to refer the legal issue to 
66
 Regina (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator; Do v Immigration Appeal Tribunal [2004] UKHL 26; 
[2004] 2 A.C. 323 at [20]. 
67
 Indeed that interpretation would not bind other ECHR States (UK decisions have no value in other 
jurisdictions), precisely because it would not constitute interpretation of the ECHR. 
68
 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1. 
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the CJEU in order to obtain the authentic interpretation.69 UK courts are not 
competent to interpret the ECHR more than they are to interpret the EU treaties. 
They need to “take into account” Strasbourg case law in order to apply the 
Convention in a manner as close as possible to the expected approach of the ECtHR 
to the case. In fact incorporation aims at avoiding the need for individuals to seek 
an international remedy in Strasbourg, which presupposes the intent to align the 
domestic judgment with the likely outcome before the ECtHR. 70
The problem potentially raised by the different interpretations given to the 
same text by different ECHR enforcers
 
71
 is not new. Since Nold72 and Hauer,73 the 
ECJ has recognized that ECHR rights were part of the fundamental principles of 
EU law, an approach codified by the Maastricht Treaty (Art.F(2)). In interpreting 
ECHR provisions within the sphere of application of EU law, the ECJ 
acknowledged the need for consistency. Cameron highlighted the ECJ’s deference 
in relation to protection of the home in Art.8. Initially, in Hoechst v Commission, 
the ECJ found that the notion of ‘home’ did not extend to business premises.74
                                                             
69
 When the meaning is clear from the wording or settled case-law of the ECJ, they are expected to 
apply accordingly. See Case 283/81 CILFIT [1982] ECR 3415 at [14] and [16]. 
 
70
  Hale,“Argentoratum Locutum: is Strasbourg or the Supreme Court Supreme?”, p. 69. 
71
 I use the term in a non-technical sense. Domestic courts in dualist countries enforce the domestic 
text giving effect to the ECHR. The EU is not as yet a party to the ECHR, and the CJEU enforces 
the ECHR merely as an indirect source of EU law categorized as general principles of law. 
However, in substance all these judicatures are called upon to apply the same instrument, regardless 
of how it is legitimized in their respective legal orders. 
72
 Case 4/73 Nold v Commission [1974] ECR 491. 
73
 Case 44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727. 
74
 Case 46/87 Hoechst v Commission [1989] ECR 2859.  
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After ECtHR’s contrary finding in Niemitz v Germany,75 in Roquette Frères76 the 
ECJ “corrected its case law to come into line with Niemietz”.77 Another example of 
rapprochement concerns transsexuals’ right to marry. KB v NHS Pensions Agency 
(2004)78 regarded the refusal to grant a widower’s pension to a female-to-male 
transsexual who had cohabited with a woman without entering marriage, as a result 
of his impossibility to alter his birth certificate. The ECJ found that it amounted to 
indirect discrimination, indicating that the principle of equal treatment in respect of 
remuneration prohibited legislation running contrary to the ECHR, and that the 
ECtHR had found in Christine Goodwin v UK (2002)79 that the impossibility for 
transsexuals to marry a person of the sex to which they belonged prior to the gender 
reassignment surgery breached Article 12. Javier García Roca appositely noted that 
in doing so the ECJ “in fact acts as a guarantor for ECtHR case law, thereby 
preventing contradictions between the legal orders of the European Union and the 
Council of Europe”.80
In the same spirit, the drafters of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
provided for a mechanism to ensure consistency between ECHR and Charter 
    
                                                             
75
 Niemietz v Germany (1993) 16 E.H.R.R. 97. 
76
 Case 44/79 Roquette Frères v Commission [2002] ECR I-9015. 
77
 Cameron, An Introduction to the European Convention, pp. 176-177. 
78
 C-117/01 KB v NHS Pensions Agency [2004] E.C.R. I-541. 
79
 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18. 
80
 J. García Roca, “The Preamble, The Convention’s Hermeneutic Context: A Constitutional 
Instrument of European Public Order”, in J. García Roca and P. Santolaya (eds.), Europe of Rights: 
A Compendium on the European Convention of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), 1, 9-10 
(emphasis in the original). 
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obligations:81
 
 Art.52(3) establishes that, “[i]n so far as th[e] Charter contains rights 
which correspond to rights guaranteed by the [ECHR], the meaning and scope of 
those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention”. This 
suggests that the CJEU will follow the ECtHR’s interpretation. It would be an 
unfortunate anomaly if, in applying the same ECHR norms, the Supreme Court, the 
Luxembourg Court and the Strasbourg Court each provided a different 
interpretation. 
Are UK Rulings Inconsistent with Strasbourg Case Law Legitimate? 
 
As suggested above, the question of whether Strasbourg judgments are 
‘binding’ on UK courts is misformulated. The more appropriate question to ask is 
whether domestic rulings disregarding Strasbourg jurisprudence are legitimate. If 
the yardstick for legitimacy is international law, courts, as “organs of the State” 
under the law on responsibility,82 are bound to observe the treaty as interpreted by 
its monitoring body. This obligation is even more stringent where the principles 
were laid down in judgments against the UK83
                                                             
81
 See D. Anderson and C. Murphy, “The Charter of Fundamental Rights”, in A. Biondi and P. 
Eeckhout (eds.), EU Law after Lisbon (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 155, 162: “Painstaking attempts […] 
have been made to ensure that the Charter in interpreted consistently with the ECHR”. 
 (see Horncastle for an example of 
82
 See Art.2 of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001). 
83
 As a consequence of the binding nature of judgments recognized in Art.46(1) (“The High 
Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they 
are parties”), States have an obligation to take the necessary measures to remedy the violation found, 
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disapplication);84
The international obligation to comply with Strasbourg jurisprudence was 
emphasized by Lord Hoffmann in AF v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department: “I agree that the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECtHR”) in A v United Kingdom [...] requires these appeals to be allowed. I do 
so with very considerable regret, because I think that the decision of the ECtHR 
was wrong [...]. [T]he United Kingdom is bound by the Convention, as a matter of 
international law, to accept the decisions of the ECtHR on its interpretation. To 
reject such a decision would almost certainly put this country in breach of the 
international obligation which it accepted when it acceded to the Convention.” 
 however, on the basis of Art.32(1), when it exercises its 
jurisdiction under Art.19, the Court’s findings on points of law have value erga 
omnes.  
85
                                                                                                                                                                          
which may involve legislative action (law amendment) or a change in administrative practice or 
domestic jurisprudence. See e.g. Ovey and White, Jacobs & White: The European Convention of 
Human Rights, p. 58 on legislative changes introduced in the UK following judgments of the 
Strasbourg Court against the UK. 
 
84
 In R. v Horncastle [2009] UKSC; 14 [2010] 2 A.C. 373, the Supreme Court chose not to follow 
the Strasbourg’s court finding in Al-Khawaja v UK (2009) 49 EHRR 1  that a conviction based 
solely, or to a decisive extent, on statements of absent witnesses, not available for cross-
examination, infringed art.6(1) and art.6(3)(d) ECHR, as established earlier in Doorson v The 
Netherlands (1996) 22 EHRR 330. 
85
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No 3) [2009] 3 WLR 74 at [70]. Lord Irvine 
strongly disapproved of this position: “It is not the Courts’ function under the HRA to determine 
cases of high Constitutional importance […] on the basis of their view of the importance of the 
UK’s standing as a good global citizen. That is an issue far better left to the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and Parliament. The consequence of the domestic Courts not following a 
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If the yardstick for legitimacy is domestic law, the obligation placed by the 
HRA on domestic tribunals to “take into account” Strasbourg jurisprudence means 
at the very least that adopting an interpretation in clear contrast with the position of 
the ECtHR on the matter is not legitimate. However, the Supreme Court seems to 
believe that the ECtHR’s interpretation can be ignored if it shows insufficient grasp 
of common law practices. In R v Lyons (No. 3) and R v Spear, it was suggested that 
if the ECtHR “has misunderstood or been misinformed about some aspect of 
English law”,86
                                                                                                                                                                          
judgment of the Strasbourg Court is that, if Government and Parliament consider it appropriate, then 
they can legislate to reverse the position.” (See Lord Irvine, A British Interpretation of Convention 
Rights (lecture hosted by UCL on 14 December 2011): 
 the domestic courts are entitled to depart from its interpretation. 
Similarly, in the 2009 Horncastle judgment, Lord Phillips found that “The 
requirement to ‘take into account’ the Strasbourg jurisprudence will normally result 
in the domestic court applying principles that are clearly established by the 
Strasbourg court. There will, however, be rare occasions where the domestic court 
has concerns as to whether a decision of the Strasbourg court sufficiently 
http://www.biicl.org/files/5786_lord_irvine_convention_rights.pdf [Accessed: October 31, 2012].) 
This observation arguably reverses the logical interaction between State branches: the role of the 
judiciary is to uphold civil rights guarantees as expressly directed by Parliament under the HRA, i.e. 
in the light of ECHR jurisprudence, and to signal any incompatibilities between domestic law and 
the ECHR; if the breach stems from primary legislation, it is not open to courts in any event to go 
against Parliament’s decision; if the breach is the consequence of an executive act, Parliament will 
have a choice to sanction the executive act or not. This role for the courts is consistent with the 
principle in Re Simms ([2000] 2 A.C. 115) that only express Parliamentary acts can curtail human 
rights. 
86
 R v Lyons (No. 3) [2002] UKHL 44 at [46]; R v Spear [2002] UKHL 31 at [12]. 
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appreciates or accommodates particular aspects of our domestic process”.87 More 
specifically, “[t]he jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court in relation to article 
6(3)(d) has developed largely in cases relating to civil law rather than common law 
jurisdictions [...] that case law appears to have developed without full consideration 
of the safeguards against an unfair trial that exist under the common law 
procedure”.88 Loveland interpreted Lord Phillips’ stance as an acknowledgement 
that “the meaning of art.6 of Sch.1 to the HRA should not be the same as that of 
art.6 ECHR”.89 This may be an unnecessary extrapolation; in fact, Lord Phillips 
argues that changes were made to English law on the admissibility of evidence 
“intended to ensure that English law complies with the requirements of article 
6(1)(3)(d)”.90
What Lord Phillips did do, however, was to posit that domestic judges can 
disregard the authoritative interpretation of the ECHR if they deem the relevant 
domestic law to be compliant with the ECHR. This amounts to a claim to self-
supervision by domestic authorities, which is hardly compatible with the Strasbourg 
court’s function (pursuant to Art.19 ECHR) of monitoring compliance with the 
Convention. To accept that the domestic judge’s conviction that the ECtHR ‘got it 
wrong’ is a valid justification for departure may have further paradoxical 
ramifications. It would render Art.46 ECHR completely ineffective, as even where 
 Rather than attempting to sanction a variance between ECHR and 
HRA rights, he maintained that the ECtHR gave insufficient weight to domestic 
efforts to respond to ECHR requirements.  
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 Horncastle at [11]. 
88
 Horncastle at [107]. 
89
 Loveland, “The shifting sands of article 8 jurisprudence in English housing law”, p. 155. 
90
 Horncastle [2009] UKSC 14 at [107]. 
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domestic proceedings were reopened following a Strasbourg finding of a breach, 
the victim could not hope for a more favourable outcome the second time around.  
This problematic option of non-compliance based on national fundamental 
principles was, however, re-proposed with some variation in Pinnock, although 
there were no objections to following Strasbourg jurisprudence in that particular 
instance. The Supreme Court noted: “Where, however, there is a clear and constant 
line of decisions whose effect is not inconsistent with some fundamental 
substantive or procedural aspect of our law, and whose reasoning does not appear to 
overlook or misunderstand some argument or point of principle, we consider that it 
would be wrong for this court not to follow that line. In the present case there is no 
question of the jurisprudence of the European court failing to take into account 
some principle or cutting across our domestic substantive or procedural law in 
some fundamental way.”91
It is not easy to reconcile this position with a core principle of international 
law, as codified in Art.27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
which establishes that municipal law can never excuse the lack of compliance with 
a treaty obligation: “A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for its failure to perform a treaty”. Bearing in mind the presumption of 
Parliament’s intention to comply with international obligations, the contention that 
 This is a further qualification of the acceptance of the 
Strasbourg authority, an autochthonous solange principle reminiscent of the 
German Bundesverfassungsgericht’s approach. In fact, the implication here is that 
the decisions of the ECtHR will be followed only to the extent that they do not 
conflict with a fundamental aspect of English law.  
                                                             
91
 Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45 at [48-49] (emphasis added). 
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the implementing statute seeks to achieve selective compliance with the ECHR has 
little credibility.  
Equally difficult to defend is the thesis that departing from Strasbourg 
jurisprudence and providing reasons therefor contributes to a constructive dialogue 
between the two courts. In Horncastle it was held: “In such circumstances it is open 
to the domestic court to decline to follow the Strasbourg decision, giving reasons 
for adopting this course. This is likely to give the Strasbourg court the opportunity 
to reconsider the particular aspect of the decision that is in issue, so that there takes 
place what may prove to be a valuable dialogue between the domestic court and the 
Strasbourg court”.92 This peculiar conception of dialogue between courts did not 
remain isolated. The Pinnock court opined: “[t]his Court is not bound to follow 
every decision of the [ECtHR]. Not only would it be impractical to do so: it would 
sometimes be inappropriate, as it would destroy the ability of the Court to engage in 
the constructive dialogue with the [ECtHR]”.93 Similarly, in a scholarly piece 
Baroness Hale writes: “it is right and healthy for national courts to feel free to 
criticise Strasbourg where its judgments have applied principles which are unclear 
or inconsistent or where it has misunderstood national law or practices”.94
Arguably, this is not the way a dialogue between courts should take place. 
The Strasbourg court should indeed take into account domestic jurisprudence when 
reaching the conclusion that pan-European consensus has evolved in a certain 
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 Horncastle at [11]. 
93
 Pinnock at [48]. 
94
 Hale,“Argentoratum Locutum: is Strasbourg or the Supreme Court Supreme?”, p. 78. 
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direction;95 once it reaches a determination on the present-day interpretation of a 
right, however, that interpretation should be applied uniformly by domestic courts. 
The input of domestic courts and the constructive dialogue mentioned in Pinnock 
should take place at the stage of scrutiny, by the Strasbourg judges, of domestic 
jurisprudence clarifying the opinio juris of the Member States on a particular aspect 
of a right; certainly not by frustrating the purpose of the creation of a binding supra-
national court, which is to enforce a consistent implementation of the ECHR across 
Europe. Moreover, the governments, through their legal advisors, have an 
opportunity, whether as respondents or intervening parties, to submit arguments to 
the attention of the court in the course of proceedings.96  Where an important 
political matter is at stake, the respondent State further has an option to request the 
referral to the Grand Chamber, and engage with the reasoning of the Chamber if it 
finds it inconsistent or otherwise flawed.97
                                                             
95
 Any such determination would have to be based on generalized State practice in Europe, including 
the practice of the courts dealing with human rights claims. This is the consequence of the afore-
mentioned European consensus doctrine. 
 These are the mechanisms the 
96
 Art. 36 (2) ECHR allows for third party intervention: “The President of the Court may, in the 
interest of the proper administration of justice, invite any High Contracting Party which is not a 
party to the proceedings or any person concerned who is not the applicant to submit written 
comments or take part in hearings”. 
97
 See Art. 43 (1): “Within a period of three months from the date of the judgment of the Chamber, 
any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the Grand 
Chamber”. The Grand Chamber [GC] has often proven willing to take a more conservative stance 
than the Chambers in order to address the concerns raised by the respondent States. See e.g. Lautsi v 
Italy (2012) 54 E.H.R.R. 3 where the GC found that the display of crucifixes in classrooms, insofar 
as passive, cultural rather than religious symbols, did not breach Art. 9 (freedom of belief) taken 
together with Art. 14 (non-discrimination), thereby reversing the Chamber’s decision in Lautsi v 
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Convention itself places at States’ disposal to facilitate dialogue. The refusal of 
domestic courts to apply Strasbourg case law – however gracious and substantiated 
with reasons – is not contemplated.  The UK will, in fact, incur international 
responsibility for non-compliance with the ECHR if its judiciary applies it in a 
manner clearly inconsistent with the ECtHR rulings, especially where the UK is the 
respondent State. The saga of the repeated condemnations for the blanket 
prohibition of prisoners’ right to vote is emblematic, even if it also reveals that the 
consequences of breaching international law may not be particularly severe.98
The domestic scepticism towards the Strasbourg Court is also a 
consequence of a culturally relativistic position depicting that Court as alien to UK 
realities. In a 2011 lecture, Lord Irvine thus proposed: “It is our own Judges who 
are embedded in our culture and society and so are best placed to strike the types of 
balance between the often competing rights and interests which adjudication under 
the HRA requires. Put shortly, more often than not we should trust our own judges 
to reach a ‘better’ answer.”
 From 
a systemic perspective, if each domestic judicature asserted its competence to 
challenge the interpretation of the ECtHR on the basis of alleged inconsistency or 
of national practices, the authority of the Strasbourg Court would be undermined.  
99
                                                                                                                                                                          
Italy (2010) 50 E.H.R.R. 42. For another recent example see S.H. and others v Austria (app. no. 
57813/00) where, unlike the Chamber, the GC found that the prohibition on the use of donated 
gametes for the purposes of artificial procreation was legitimate and fell within the State’s margin or 
appreciation, given the complex ethical issues involved. 
 These concerns, however, have already been 
98
 Hirst v United Kingdom (2006) 42 EHRR 41; Greens and M.T. v United Kingdom (2011) 53 
EHRR 21 .  
99
 Lord Irvine, A British Interpretation of Convention Rights. In his article “Strasbourg 
Jurisprudence and the Human Rights Act: a Response to Lord Irvine” (2012) Public Law, 1, Philip 
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addressed by the margin of appreciation doctrine elaborated by the Strasbourg 
Court, which reserves to itself a subsidiary control of human rights compliance, 
limited to cases where national authorities exceed the latitude left to them by the 
Convention. As recognized in Handyside v United Kingdom (1976), “[b]y reason of 
their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, State 
authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an 
opinion on the exact content of these requirements [of morals] as well as on the 
‘necessity’ of a ‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ intended to meet them”.100 The Court has 
indeed proved deferential to national authorities in numerous matters, such as 
national security concerns and the determination of a state of emergency for the 
purposes of entering a derogation under Article 15 ECHR. In A v United Kingdom 
(2009),101 a case regarding the indefinite detention of suspected terrorists not 
susceptible to deportation, the Court reiterated that national authorities are best 
placed to assess an emergency, and whereas the UK was the only ECHR State to 
have lodged a derogation after 9/11, each government was entitled to make its own 
assessment of the threat.102
                                                                                                                                                                          
Sales argues that “the subjective views of a promoter of an Act of Parliament about its meaning are 
not a relevant aid to its construction”. It should be added that views expressed in an academic 
context after the adoption of the Act carry less weight than comments advanced during legislative 
debates in an institutional capacity (see above). 
 Therefore it considered that the findings of the House of 
Lords on the validity of the derogation needed to be endorsed unless manifestly 
100
 Handyside v United Kingdom (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 737 at [48]. 
101
 A. and Others v United Kingdom (2009) 49 EHRR 29. 
102
 The ECtHR had already recognized in Brannigan and McBride v United Kingdom (1994) 17 
EHRR 539 that national authorities are better placed to assess the existence of an emergency for the 
purposes of Art. 15. 
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unreasonable. The Court further considered it appropriate to follow the thorough 
assessment of the proportionality of the measures with the exigencies of the 
situation carried out by the House of Lords. Similarly, in controversial and sensitive 
areas the Court is highly obsequious of national policies, and recognizes that, for 
instance, matters such as bioethics (Evans v United Kingdom),103 blasphemy 
(Wingrove v United Kingdom),104 euthanasia (Pretty v United Kingdom),105 same-
sex marriage (Parry v United Kingdom),106 fall within States’ discretion. Under the 
fourth instance doctrine, the Court will also be reluctant to question the findings of 
fact and decisions of national courts in a particular case, unless blatantly 
unreasonable.107
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 Evans v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 34 at [59]. See further at [60]: “the Chamber did not 
find, therefore, that the absence of a power to override a genetic parent’s withdrawal of consent, 
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required by Article 8 or to exceed the wide margin of appreciation afforded to the State”. 
104
 See Wingrove v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 1  at [57]: “there is as yet not sufficient 
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conclude that a system whereby a State can impose restrictions on the propagation of material on the 
basis that it is blasphemous is, in itself, unnecessary in a democratic society and thus incompatible 
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 Pretty v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 1. 
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 Parry v United Kingdom (App. No. 42971/05). 
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 See Kemmache v France (no. 3) (1995) 19 EHRR 349 at [44]: “In principle, and without 
prejudice to its power to examine the compatibility of national decisions with the Convention, it is 
not the Court's role to assess itself the facts which have led a national court to adopt one decision 
rather than another. If it were otherwise, the Court would be acting as a court of third or fourth 
instance, which would be to disregard the limits imposed on its action”. 
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Strasbourg authority and inconsistent earlier domestic precedents 
 
Pinnock clarified that “House of Lords decisions have to be seen against the 
backdrop of the evolving Strasbourg jurisprudence”,108
In Leeds/ Kay, Lord Bingham maintained that lower courts should adhere to 
the traditional rule of precedent to achieve the greatest degree of legal certainty.
 i.e. the highest judicature 
can depart from its precedent to adjust to the ECHR. The question is whether the 
doctrine of precedent should automatically qualify lower courts’ interpretative 
obligation under s.2 HRA, requiring them to ignore the ECtHR’s divergent 
interpretation intervened after the highest courts’ pronouncements.  
109
 
One objection to that view is that it is highly uncommon for statutes to give 
instructions to courts concerning the method to be used for their interpretation;110
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 Pinnock at [47]. 
 
therefore, the statutory instruction in s.2 HRA should be seen as lex specialis, thus 
prevailing over the general rules on interpretation, including precedence. Also, the 
HRA requires all courts and tribunals to take into account the Strasbourg 
interpretation, and lists no exception; this suggests a priority in favour of applying 
Strasbourg judgments subsequent to the higher courts’ decisions where in contrast. 
Furthermore, since the HRA only places obligations on public authorities, not 
private parties, the legal certainty argument is less cogent (although courts’ 
109
 Kay and others v Lambeth LBC; Leeds City Council v Price [2006] UKHL 10; [2006] 2 A.C. 465 
at [43]. 
110
 See Loveland, Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and Human Rights, p. 640: “Legislation 
rarely instructs the courts as to the principles of statutory interpretation which they should deploy. 
An exception is provided by ss 2-3 of the European Communities Act 1972 [...]”.  
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decisions in proceedings between private parties may engage HRA rights and 
trigger an incidental horizontal effect).111
The comparison with the interplay between EU law and constitutional 
principles is again useful. The CJEU established that domestic rules on judicial 
hierarchy cannot deprive lower courts from their prerogative under the Treaty to 
refer a case to Luxembourg.
 
112
 Also, Thoburn v Sunderland indicated that the HRA 
pertains to the same category of ‘constitutional statutes’ as the ECA, of particular 
importance and immune from implied repeal.113
 
 Like the ECA 1972, the HRA 1998 
therefore occupies a privileged position in domestic law. 
Does the ‘mirror principle’ require self-restraint? 
 
Lewis maintains that equating HRA rights with ECHR rights (“the mirror 
principle”) prevents domestic authorities from affording individuals greater 
protection than under the ECHR. It is difficult to see why that must be the case. The 
ECHR establishes minimum requirements; it does not impose uniform regulation of 
human rights within the Council of Europe, but rather ensures that national 
standards do not fall below shared values. Thus, the Strasbourg authorities’ failure 
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to recognize same-sex couples as ‘family life’ under the ECHR until 2010114
Lord Brown’s finding in Al-Skeini that HRA requests “no less, but certainly 
no more” than what Strasbourg ascertains to be the law
 did 
not bar the UK’s introduction of civil partnerships; it only meant that other States 
were not bound to provide same-sex couples legal recognition. In matters where 
there is little commonality of legislative choices across Europe, States enjoy a wide 
margin of appreciation in deciding aspects unregulated at Strasbourg level. 
Similarly, the fact that only Strasbourg can pronounce on Convention rights does 
not mean that domestic judges cannot go beyond the protection required by that 
court.  
115
 should not be read as 
inhibiting domestic judges from taking a more protective approach. The HRA does 
not require, but surely does not preclude more than the ECHR prescribes. In fact, 
ECHR obligations incorporated with the HRA do not affect the residual decision-
making power legislatures and courts have in the field of human rights. The 
depiction of the ECHR as a ceiling consequently lacks a valid basis, as there is no 
normative conflict between the enactment of limited obligations internationally 
assumed under a treaty and the more wide-ranging domestic legislation. As the 
ECtHR suggested in Wemhoff v Germany, where two interpretations are possible, 
preference should be given to the one furthering individual rights, not limiting State 
obligations.116
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Consequently, if a litigant brings a claim under the HRA, the domestic court 
cannot afford less protection than required under the ECHR, but can interpret the 
right more generously based on all domestic law. For example, in Re EM the House 
of Lords was willing to recognize extra-territorial effect to the right to family 
life,117 whereas the ECtHR has so far recognized such effect to Articles 3 and 6 
ECHR, but not 8.118
The idea that the level of protection guaranteed under ECHR obligations 
does not prevent ECHR-compliant jurisdictions from going further seemed patent 
to the drafters of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Even though the rights in 
the Charter reproducing ECHR rights have the scope determined under the latter, 
Article 52(3) emphasizes in fine that “This provision shall not prevent Union law 
providing more extensive protection”. As commentators have noted, “[t]his 
suggests that the ECHR is intended to function as a floor but not necessarily as a 
ceiling’,
 
119
 and “Article 52… provides for at least equivalent protection of 
Convention rights under the Charter system”.120
                                                                                                                                                                          
achieve the object of the treaty, not that which would restrict to the greatest possible degree the 
obligations undertaken by the Parties”. 
 Municipal courts applying 
domestic legislation corresponding to ECHR obligations should take a similar 
approach. 
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Concluding remarks 
 
Schedule 1 HRA is not a domestic bill of rights, autonomous in its meaning 
and subject to municipal courts’ interpretation. The HRA is a statute expressly 
aimed at rendering operative a set of treaty norms within the UK jurisdiction. The 
requirement that the statutory provisions should be identical to the corresponding 
international provisions is clearly established in the incorporating statute in the 
sections on definitions and interpretative principles. This is consistent with the 
presumption that Parliament did not intend to legislate in contrast with UK’s 
international obligations.  
In 2012 the Commission on a Bill of Rights reported on the adequacy of a 
separate, indigenous UK charter.121 Such an instrument would permit a more 
creative interpretation of human rights, as well as the codification of existing 
domestic case law going beyond Strasbourg requirements.122
Precisely because in the HRA Parliament required courts to adjust the 
meaning of all statutory provisions to that of the international norms incorporated, 
blatant departure from the evolving Strasbourg interpretation is unwarranted. There 
 Convention rights are, 
in fact, only one facet of the UK’s protection of fundamental rights. 
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is no basis to suggest that a bona fide application of the ECtHR’s authoritative 
interpretation of Convention rights should give way to domestic judges’ perception 
of that court’s consistency or grasp of English law. Conversely, the HRA may well 
provide the impulse for further development of rights under common law.  
The Strasbourg Court’s judicial activism means that the UK found itself 
bound by more than it had bargained for, but unless and until the UK denounces the 
ECHR, the proper extent of ECHR obligations, domestically enforceable by virtue 
of the HRA, remains prescribed by the ECtHR. By the same token, unless and until 
Parliament repeals or amends the HRA, domestic courts are expected not to fall 
below the standards of protection of fundamental rights expounded in Strasbourg 
jurisprudence. 
